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REHABILITATING THE JUVENILE COURT
CHARLES E. SPRINGER*
INTRODUCTION
I could not go on living if I did not feel with my whole heart a
moral structure with real meaning... and some kind of higher




In 1899 the Illinois legislature devised a "peculiar system
for juveniles, unknown to our law." 2 Toying with the judicial
branch of government, the Illinois legislature created a "juve-
nile court." The new juvenile court had jurisdiction over "any
child under the age of sixteen years who violates any law"; 3 but
for young law violators the "idea of crime and punishment was
to be abandoned." 4 Youthful criminals were not brought
before the juvenile court to be dealt justice but, rather, "to be
'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from appre-
hension through institutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather
than punitive. '
The juvenile court founders were "profoundly convinced
that society's duty to the child could not be confined by the
concept of justice alone. They believed that society's role was
not to ascertain whether the child was 'guilty' or 'innocent,' "
* Presently a member of the Nevada -Supreme Court, Vice-Justice
Charles E. Springer is a former member of the board of trustees of the
National Council ofJuvenile and Family Court Judges. He served for seven
years as Juvenile Court Master in the Nevada courts and is currently on the
faculty of the National College ofJuvenile and Family Law and of McGeorge
Law School, University of the Pacific, where he teaches juvenile law. His
LL.B degree is from Georgetown; LL.M, from the University of Virginia. His
master's thesis, published by the Department ofJustice in monograph form,
is entitled Justice for Juvenies.
1. Crimes and Misdemeanors (Orion Pictures Corp. 1989) [hereinafter
Allen, Crimes and Misdemeanors].
2. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
3. IllinoisJuvenile Court Act § 1, 1899 III. Laws 132.
4. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
5. Id. at 16.
398 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY (Vol. 5
but, rather, what, in the child's best interest, could be done "to
save him from a downward career."'
This is the picture then: in 1899 the Illinois legislature,
with procrustean abandon, wedged into the existing judicial
structure a peculiar non-court which was forbidden to do jus-
tice and was commanded to abandon the criminal law in crimi-
nal cases and to behave not as a court of justice, but as a clinic.
How bold, how daring, how innovative.., how wrongi
Borrowing the juvenile court's own shibboleth, "rehabili-
tation," I will argue that, mainly because of the inherent con-
ceptual fallacy that a court can be made into a clinic, the
juvenile, court is in urgent need itself of rehabilitation, a need
to "re-establish the character and reputation"" of the juvenile
court.
To enhance the character and reputation of the juvenile
court, to rehabilitate the juvenile court, we must remodel and
remoralize it. By "remodel" I mean casting off the 1899 clinical
model. By "remoralize" I mean two things: to briny to the
juvenile court a "moral structure with real meaning" and to
restore the morale of those who are responsible for conducting
the affairs of the juvenile court.
In the remodeled, rehabilitated juvenile court that I pro-
pose, the term "juvenile justice" will take on real meaning. No
longer will the juvenile court be seen as a quasi-judicial court-
clinic but, rather, as a real court, administering real justice in its
traditional retributive and distributive meanings.' As I argue
in this paper, I believe that juveniles should have to pay for
their crimes; but, I also believe that society has a duty to its
young delinquents to help them to gain moral and civic
equilibrium.
6. L at 15.
7. OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY 1693 (ed. 1955) (entry under
"rehabilitation").
8. Allen, Crimes and Misdemeanors, supra note 1.
9. See, for example, Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book V, ch. 3:
"[O]ne kind [ofjustice] is that which is manifested in distributions of honor or
money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a
share in the constitution... (and the other] one is that which plays a rectifying
part in transactions between man and man." Great Books of the Western World,
vol. 9, at 378 (W. Benton, publisher, Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Inc., 1952)
(emphasis supplied). The two forms of justice are commonly referred to as
(1) distributive justice and (2) retributive, rectificatory or commutative
justice.
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Ajustice-modeled juvenile court will be a court with moral
substance and clarity of purpose. The remodeled, remoralized
court will at last have a "basis to know how to live."' 0
In advancing my proposal for rehabilitating the juvenile
court by remodeling it, I will first show that the juvenile court
system is founded on a false premise. I will then argue for the
institution of a new, moral model based upon justice alone,
after which I will show how such a model might be installed and
operated within the juvenile system as it exists today.
1. The Court-Clinic: An Idea Whose Time Has Come - And Gone
Science robs men of wisdom and usually converts them into phan-
tom beings loaded up with facts.
Miguel de Unamuno"
When I said that the Illinois legislature was "toying" with
the judicial branch, I meant just that. Trying to turn a court
into a clinic was a "simple-minded"' 2 idea "hatched in a Vien-
nese laboratory. "" Based on a social science theory, untested
at the time but now generally repudiated, the Illinois legisla-
ture proceeded to cast off the system of criminal laws devel-
oped over centuries and to decriminalize all criminal offenses
committed by persons under the age of sixteen. As Francis
Allen has said:
Ignorance, in itself, is not disgraceful so long as it is
unavoidable. But when we rush to measures affecting
human liberty and human dignity on the assumption that
we know what we do not know or can do what we cannot
do, then the problem of ignorance takes on a more sinis-
ter hue. ' 4
It may be easy to say today that the court-clinic idea was
simple-minded and based on ignorance and faulty assump-
tions, but in the first part of this century it was an idea whose
time had come. Few were able to see the "sinister hue"'15
10. lit
11. M. UNAMUNO, ESSAYS AND SOLILOQUIES 55 (1925).
12. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theoy of Punishment, reprinted in 6 RES
JUDICATAE 224, 227 (1953).
13. Id.
14. Allen, The Rehabilitative Ideal, reprinted in CONTEMPORARY
PUNISHMENT: VIEWs, EXPLANATIONS, ANDJUSTIF'ICATIONS 215 (R. Gerber & P.
McAnany eds. 1972).
15. Id. The "sinister hue" surrounding the clinical treatment of
criminals, the so-called "medical model," is exemplified, I think, in a report
on the assassination-murder of Bernardo Jaramillo, the Patriotic Union's
1991]
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attendant to the abandonment of justice and the creation of an
amoral clinic for the criminally ill, and juvenile-court fever
spread throughout the land and throughout the world.' 6
Those who questioned the scientific dogma were consid-
ered reactionary as the social scientists assured us of the valid-
ity of the new scheme. Noted social scientist of the time,
Sheldon Glueck, told us in 1928 that criminal law could be
safely discarded as an archaic form of "sublimated social ven-
geance" and described "just retribution" in terms of being an
"'old argument" that "no thoughtful person today seriously
holds. '5 Notwithstanding the force behind the supposedly
"scientific" pronouncements, some "thoughtful persons," like
the Cambridge professor and author C.S. Lewis,' and
renowned law professor and author John H. Wigmore,19 con-
tinued to hold to the "old argument."
Although he had some difficulty in getting his views pub-
lished, 20 C.S. Lewis presents a rather cogent critique of the the-
ory that threatened to replace justice in our courts. Lewis
called the new, amoral doctrine "simpleminded" and argued
strenuously against placing criminals "in the hands of technical
experts whose special sciences do not even employ such cate-
gories as rights or justice" and who ignore "the community's
moral judgment on the degree of ill-desert" that must come
into play when criminal justice is applied. A further sample of
his wisdom-filled but then-unpopular rhetoric appears in the
margin.2'
candidate for president of Columbia at the May 1990 elections. According to
THE EcONOMIST:
Jaramillo's official bodyguard could not protect him from a 16-
year-old, who is said to have been paid $600 for the job; as a minor
he faces juvenile court and may go free.
Cocaine and Friends, THE EcONOMIST, March 31, 1990, at 38. I am not sug-
gesting, of course, that juvenile courts are presently wont to letting sixteen-
year-old murderers "go free," but the Economist reporter obviously saw this
as a threat in the reported case.
16. By 1917, all but three states had passed juvenile court acts.
17. Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV. L. REV. 453, 456
(1928).
18. See Lewis, supra note 12.
19. See, e.g., Wigmore,Juvenile Court vs. Criminal Court, 21 ILL. L. REV.
375 (1926).
20. At the conclusion of his article Lewis noted: "One last word. You
may ask why I send this to an Australian periodical. The reason is simple and
perhaps worth recording: I can get no hearing for it in England." Lewis,
supra note 12, at 230.
21.They are not punishing, not inflicting, only healing. But do not
let us be deceived by a name. To be taken without consent from my
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The most relevant, most timely, and most correct response
to the juvenile court epidemic was offered by Illinois' own
esteemed law professor and writer,John H. Wigmore. In 1926,
at the very peak of juvenile court ague, Wigmore wrote an edi-
torial note on the new juvenile law for the Illinois Law Review.
Wigmore was moved to write the note after he learned about a
"gang of four schoolboys, ages between thirteen and sixteen,
[who] were arrested in Chicago for safe-breaking. They had
drills and explosives, and they had already within three months
robbed seventeen safes."12  What worried Wigmore about
these young men was that by virtue of the new juvenile law "all
the worst offenses are withdrawn from the regular courts of
criminal law,"2" and thus these thirteen- to sixteen-year-old
criminals were turned over to the juvenile court authorities,
who were forbidden to punish the young criminals for their
criminal deeds.
Wigmore was very much concerned by the wholesale
decriminalization of such a large section of the criminal popula-
tion. He made it clear that he was "opposed to this innova-
tion '9 2 4 and minced no words in saying why:
[Ilts devoted advocates, in their zeal, have lost their bal-
ance. And, as usual in other fields of science that have
been awakening to their interest in the crime problem,
their error is due to their narrow and imperfect concep-
tion of the criminal law. They are new to it, hence their
inability to understand it.
2 5
At a time when almost everyone else seemed to be com-
pletely captivated by the new scientific criminology, Wigmore
home and friends; to lose my liberty; to undergo all those assaults
on my personality which modern psychotherapy knows how to
deliver; to be remade after some pattern of 'normality' hatched in a
Viennese laboratory to which I never professed allegiance; to know
that this process will never end until either my captors have
succeeded or I grown wise enough to cheat them with apparent
success-who cares whether it is called Punishment or not? That it
includes most of the elements for which any punishment is feared-
shame, exile, bondage, and years eaten by the locust-4s obvious.
Only enormous ill-desert could justify it; but ill.desert is the very
conception which the Humanitarian theory has thrown
overboard.... Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the
good of its victims may be the most oppressive.
Lewis, supra note 12, at 227-28.
22. Wigmore, supra note 19, at 375.
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challenged the "devoted social workers and cold scientists, ' 26
saying:
Do not think that you have the right to demand that all
crimes be turned over to your charge until you have
looked a little more deeply into the criminal law and have
a better comprehension of the whole of its functions..27
The "cold scientists" of whom Wigmore wrote did indeed
demand that all crimes be turned over to their charge; and this
is where all the trouble started. They wanted it all.
Norval Morris supported the "old argument" when he
cautioned that treatment and rehabilitation "must not be seen
as purposive in the sense that criminals are to be sent to prison
for treatment."' 28 Morris puts it in this way:
There is a sharp distinction between the purposes of
incarceration and the opportunities for the training and
assistance of prisoners that may be pursued within those
purposes. The system is corrupted when we fail to pre-
serve this distinction, and this failure pervades the
world's prison programs.2 9
The failure to recognize the simple proposition that "treat-
ment" of the individual offender cannot be the end and all of
the juvenile court process has indeed "corrupted" the juvenile
system in this country and throughout the world. "What
should distinguish the juvenile from the criminal courts is their
greater emphasis on rehabilitation not their preoccupation with
it.""'° Although change is in the air, the juvenile court is still
immersed in and "preoccupied" with rehabilitation and "indi-
vidualized treatment."'' s Herein lies the essential weakness of
the juvenile system.
26. Id at 377.
27. Id.
28. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 15 (1974).
29. Id. (emphasis in original).
30. PRESIDENT's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION oFJusTIcE, THE CHALENGE OF CnME IN A FREaE SOCIETY, 55
(1967).
31. This preoccupation was brought home to me at a recent national
meeting of juvenile probation officers at which I heard a young probation
officer rise and introduce himself as a "delinquency diagnostician."
According to a former president of the National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges:
The goal-oriented approach has been the basis [policy] upon which
juvenile justice systems operate once the child has come within the
jurisdiction of the court. The penal codes of this country speak in
terms of punishment for one who has been convicted of a crime. In
contrast, the juvenile justice system speaks of restoration of the child
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2. A Court in Need of Reform: Remodeling the Juvenile Court
All reform except a moral one will prove unavailing.
Carlyle 2
I have respectfully suggested that the juvenile court is in
need of rehabilitation-in need, that is, of reestablishing its
reputation and character.
The reputation of the juvenile court has suffered because
of the self-proclaimed preoccupation of the court with a
clinical, non-punitive approach to juvenile criminality. Most
people do not believe that punishment for crime should be
abandoned in favor of an arcane treat-the-sick scheme. For a
long time the public put up with a juvenile system that oper-
ated in secret, without having any real idea of what was going
on behind those closed doors. Those days are over, and the
public will no longer stand for this kind of "juvenile justice."
Too often the public hears of some terrible crime being com-
mitted by some "unidentified juveniles" and never hears
another thing about it. The public is entitled to vindication in
cases of the commission of a serious crime by anyone, whatever
the age of the criminal. The public is justifiably outraged to be
told that criminal acts are being met only by solicitous counsel-
ing, treatment or rehabilitation.
Because of its innate character defect in the form of its
continued and insistent reliance on science over morality, the
juvenile court has been slow to recognize the declining condi-
tion of its reputation or to respond to public opinion. Because
of this, recent reforms and changes in the juvenile court system
have been imposed from without rather than being generated
from within. Largely as a result of public reaction, in recent
years a number of state legislatures have been moving away
from the plenary decriminalization of juvenile law-breakers
exampled by the early juvenile legislation. Responding to pub-
lic pressures, these state legislatures have amended juvenile
court acts to expand on the traditional stated purpose of the
juvenile acts, that of protecting "the best interests of the
child," and have added to legislative purpose clauses language
which allows the juvenile courts to consider the "best interests
as a law abiding member of society .... [E]ach child must be
considered on an individualized basis of individual needs .... The
diagnosis of the child's needs should be as methodically analyzed as
a physician analyzes an illness for a patient.
Powell, Disposition Concepts, 34 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1-2. (1983).
32. T. CARLYLE, CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEous ESSAYS 204 (1869).
1991)
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of the state," or similar public interests."3 These statutory
changes are designed to allow delinquency dispositions to
include punishment as well as treatment and rehabilitation.
Under such amendments juvenile courts may levy punitive
sanctions on juveniles for utilitarian purposes of deterrence or
rehabilitation. No legislature has provided for the kind of jus-
tice model that I propose here.H.
Juvenile court systems throughout the country now suffer
from a muddle of models. Some still subscribe to the pure
clinical model; others follow a rather poorly defined punish-
ment-rehabilitation hybrid model; still others, moving from
tears to tear-gas, have adopted procedures in delinquency
cases that are long on punishment and very short on rehabilita-
tion. There is little or no consensus on what juvenile courts
throughout the country are really all about. As one commenta-
tor has noted:
[Jiuvenile justice systems seem to operate like a pendu-
lum clock, swinging slowly back and forth across a com-
pass of ideas, knocking down and putting back up pegs
representing one theory and approach or another. This
proposition can be proven by looking at modem day
juvenile codes.3 5
There are two other troublesome failings of the juvenile
system that should be addressed if we are interested in its reha-
bilitation. One is the failure to define properly what a child
is; the other is the present-day overformalization and
33. See generally Ferd, Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U.L. REV. 821, 851-79.
34. The California juvenile code gives some illustration of the kinds of
changes being enacted. For example, the California juvenile court is
required to give its juveniles "care treatment and guidance." CAL. WELF. &
INST. § 202b (West 1984 & Supp. 1990). At the same time it must hold its
juvenile criminals "accountable for their behavior." Id. To me
"accountable" means that you have to pay-up. It means you owe something.
The word "retribution" means repayment or recompense; so one would
assume that in the case of a youthful offender justice must be done by
retribution. He must pay for his crime. Still, I note this sentence in the
California act: " 'Punishment' for the purpose of this chapter, does not
include retribution." Id. at § 202d. Punishment in California is all right,
however, if it is "consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter."
Id. at § 202b. One cannot tell if the legislature was adopting a justice
(retributive), crime control, or rehabilitation model or some roughly-mixed
combination of all three. This could be avoided by the frank adoption of a
justice model that required accountability and follow-up rehabilitative efforts.
35. McGee, Measured Steps Toward Clarity and Balance in the Juvenile Justice
System, 40(3) Juv. & FAM. CT.J. 5 (1989).
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recriminalization of the juvenile court-a failing that I call
"Gaultamania."
First, with respect to what may be called a definitional
defect, I note that in the original act a delinquent was any
"child" (ages zero to sixteen) who broke the law. Today this
definition includes a child of seventeen or even older. The
problem with this definition is that Wigmore's sixteen-year-old
safe-cracker cannot, under any reasonable definition of the
term, be called a child. We must define what a "real" child is
and separate the child from the older, more responsible youth
if we are going to do justice in the juvenile court. I address this
problem in the last part of this paper when I try to apply my
ideas to juvenile court process.
Next, I want to speak to the problem of Gaultamanial6 in
the juvenile courts. This defect is directly traceable to the
clinical model. From the inception of the juvenile court judges
have been punishing juveniles but calling it "treatment." The
Supreme Court has now told us in Gault,3 7 Winship" and other
cases that if we are going to "treat" delinquents in juvenile
prisons we must first properly find them guilty of the illness for
which they are to be confined. This is a paradox worth
pondering.
Although the Supreme Court directed that attorneys and
due process protections be provided only in cases in which
punitive confinement is the prescribed disposition, panic flared
in the juvenile courts, and as a result of heedless overreaction
to these decisions by juvenile court officials, young bicycle
thieves are now given lawyers and virtually all the procedural
formalities that are available to the criminally accused in the
adult system. The result of this panic has been a terrific over-
36. Gaulhamania is the unnecessary overuse of formalized criminal
procedures, lawyers and judges in the administration of a children's court.
Gault (387 U.S. 1 (1967)), involved the notorious Jerry Gault, who was
accused of making an obscene phone call. ("Have you got big bombers?")
He denied it. Without notice of charges, counsel, or a semblance of a fair
hearing, Jerry was found guilty and hustled off to a boys' school for
"treatment" of up to five years duration. The Supreme Court, quite
understandably, decided, that even though they called it treatment,
commitment to the boys' school was really punishment, and this called for
due process involving counsel and other rights which one might expect as a
condition to one's being locked up in this fashion. The next thing we knew,
the juvenile courts were filled with lawyers, and bewildered little waifs were
seen in open court standing with blank faces listening to a robed figure
reciting an incomprehensible litany of constitutional rights.
37. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
38. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
1991)
406 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5
load on juvenile court resources, one that has diminished the
power of the juvenile courts to do their real job.
In the Gaultamaniac juvenile court we have a court that
not only does not know what a child is, it does not know what a
criminal is. Too often in today's juvenile court we are treating
children like criminals and criminals like children.
In the motion picture, Gorky Park,"9 there is a scene in
which a local policeman keeps complaining to a KGB agent
about what he refers to as "the gap." On being pressed, the
local policeman describes this gap as being "the gap between
what we say and what we do." One of the major consequences
of having left justice out of the juvenile court has been the con-
stant gap between what is said and what is done. It is my inten-
tion now to show how this gap can be greatly narrowed simply
by installing a moral model, a justice model, as the framework
for juvenile court process.
3. The Case For a Moral Juvenile Court
Justice has nothing to do with expediency. Justice has nothing to
do with any temporary standard whatever. It is rooted and
grounded in the fundamental instincts of humanity.
Woodrow Wilson 40
We often hear it said that this country is in a state of moral
crisis. We certainly cannot blame a demoralized juvenile court
for this crisis, but I do think we are entitled to believe that insti-
tution of a morally-based juvenile' court system will in some
measure help to establish a better moral climate for the youth
of this country. As I have pointed out, acceptance of the
clinical model has brought the juvenile system dangerously
close to rejecting ethical exhortation and replacing it with an
unproved and virtually untried scheme of social therapeutics
which assumes that wrongness of deed is a disease rather than a
moral fault. Psychiatric superstar Karl Menninger once wrote
that "the very word justice irritates scientists."14 1 That scientists
are irritated and that Dr. Glueck thinks that "no thoughtful per-
son" 42 could believe in justice does not take away from the fact
that throughout the history of humankind our greatest teachers
and most admired human beings have shown us the truth and
value of the moral life. Morality and the ethical concepts of
39. Gorky Park (Orion Pictures Corp. 1983).
40. W. WILSON, A Talk to the Gridiron Club, in 36 THE PAPERS OF
WooDRow WILSON 270 (A. Link ed. 1981).
41. K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 17 (1968).
42. Glueck, supra note 17, at 456.
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right and wrong may not be susceptible to scientific measure-
ment, "but they're there."143
Justice as a virtue is indeed "there," and I need not apolo-
gize for advancing the old argument that justice should over-
ride social science theory in modeling the juvenile court.
Wigmore knew this; and he knew how the "psychiatrists [were]
going wrong. ' 44 They were going wrong by failing to recog-
nize essential function of any court of justice, namely, that "it
pronounces and reaffirms the moral law."4 Wigmore feared
that these "cold scientists" were well "on their way to abolish
the criminal law and undermine social morality." 46
I should not have to say much to any audience (except per-
haps of "cold scientists") in opposition to any proposal to abol-
ish the criminal law or to the undermining of social morality;
still, let me say a word in defense of law and morality.
With regard to the criminal law, there are practical as well
as moral reasons for not abolishing it. Ephraim Tutt defined
law as the rules which enable us to live harmoniously with our-
selves and with our rulers. 7 It is hard to imagine harmony
resulting from any set of rules or laws to which is not attached
some unpleasant consequence or sanction for violation. With-
out enforcement, without resultant unpleasant consequences
for violation, a rule or a law becomes only a suggestion, an
option or choice, not a command. It is quite obvious to me,
then, that society must insist on imposing sanctions on all law-
breakers, young or old, and not rely on mere individual correc-
tion or reform. Society has the right and the duty to punish law
violators, because it is inherently just and because it is neces-
sary in order to uphold the integrity of the legal prohibitions
adopted by the rulers of the society. There is, thus, in an
imperfect world, a practical, as well as a moral necessity for the
institution and enforcement of criminal laws.
The criminal law can also be defended on moral grounds.
It is not jut to law-abiders that law-violators not be made to
suffer some adverse consequence for their offenses. Punish-
ment is what they deserve because they got out of line. These
principles are so right, so basic, so elemental, that it is hard to
43. 1 quote from the Irish lady who was being interviewed by a sidewalk
reporter in Dublin. Asked the question, "Do you believe in Leprechauns, in
the 'little people'?" Her answer was, "Oh no ... but, they're there!"
44. Wigmore, supra note 19, at 376.
45. Met
46. Jed
47. E. Turr, YANKEE LAwYER: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF EPHRAiM Turr
(1944).
19911
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understand how they could have been so cavalierly rejected by
the founders of the juvenile court.
The truth of the matter is that despite the insistence of
social scientists that "all crimes be turned over to [their]
charge" 48 and despite appellate court rulings reversing juvenile
courts for even mentioning the abominable word "punish-
ment," the juvenile court has been, by and large, conducted as
a court and not a clinic and as an institution which properly
"pronounces and reaffirms the moral law."49 The problem is
with the model, not with the judges and probation officers who
conduct the affairs of the juvenile court. The officers of the
juvenile court have as a general rule followed their moral intui-
tion and seen to it that guilty juvenile offenders were somehow
punished even if this was contrary to the spirit and letter of
codified and case law. My experience as a judicial educator and
as an activist in the juvenile court system tells me that the juve-
nile court judges and juvenile probation officers, who, for the
most part, "run the system," have been operating under
assumptions not very far from what I am advancing here. My
personal view is partially supported by a 1983 survey of juve-
nile court judges in which the jurists were asked whether they
agreed with this statement: "Punishment is a morally desirable
goal for the juvenile justice system." Only about one in five
disagreed.' The author of the survey expressed his surprise to
learn that the juvenile court judges evidenced such "strong"
support for punishment as a morally justified function of the
juvenile court. He found this to be "a most interesting and sur-
prising response for judges in an ostensibly treatment-oriented
system." 5 1
I was not at all surprised to learn that juvenile court judges
believe that punishment is a morally desirable goal for the juve-
nile justice system. Juveniles ought to be punished for their
crimes, and juvenile court judges know it. I cannot say, then,
that the judges or the probation officers are in need of reform
or rehabilitation--only the juvenile justice system.
As juvenile courts have administered retributive justice, so
have they administered distributive justice. They have con-
stantly tried to give to delinquents what, in justice, they
deserve-namely, care, guidance, control and discipline. Those
48. Wigmore, supra note 19, at 377.
49. Id. at 376.
50. Kittel,JuvenileJustice Philosophy in Minnesota, 34Juv. & FAM. CT.J. 93,
97 (Feb., 1983).
51. Id
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who wish to call this dutiful activity of the court "therapy" may
do so, but I see it in terms ofjustice. The juvenile courts have
the moral and legal duty to give "care "2 and "discipline ' '," to
its delinquent wards and to treat them in a manner that will
"approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given
by their parents," '  and this is true irrespective of any sup-
posed "therapeutic" benefits. The juvenile court must act as a
sort of parent, parenspatriae,55to its delinquent wards. As a par-
ent, it has the affirmative responsibility of doing more than
merely punishing and forgetting the delinquent youth who
come before the court. Thejuvenile court is bound by law and
moral imperative to do everything within its power for delin-
quent juveniles to retrain and reeducate them, to make them
more competent human beings and better citizens and to show
them the way toward better, more honest lives in which they
practice respect for the law, respect for themselves, and respect
for others.
In the sixth century Justinian defined justice as the "con-
stant and perpetual inclination to give everyone his due."56
Distributive justice means rendering to our erring youth what is
their due. This kind ofjustice is what distinguishes the juvenile
courts from the adult courts, and from all other courts, past or
present.
I conclude my case for the adoption of a justice model for
the juvenile court with a word of caution: to beware of any
promises of a "quick fix" for the problems of juvenile crime.
At their very best the courts cannot be expected to have the
answer to juvenile criminality. Although I believe that deter-
rence and rehabilitation are effective in some cases for prevent-
ing crime, there are far too many other factors involved to rest
our hopes for a more law-abiding society on a reformed and
remodeled juvenile court.
Like Edmund Burke, "I do not know the method of draw-
ing up an indictment against a whole society,"57 but I do
52. Illinois Juvenile Court Act § 21, 1899 I11. Laws 137.
53. Id.
54. I
55. The doctrine of parens patriae, which views the state as a surrogate
parent, was accepted by the courts even before the 1899Juvenile Court Act.
See, e.g., Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839). ("[M]ay not the natural
parents when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy of it, be
superseded by the parens patriae or common guardian of the community?").
56. Justinian, Institutes 1.1, quoted in DICTIONARY OF MORAL THEOLOGY
673 (P. Palazzini ed. 1962). Cf Romans 13:7 ("Render to all men whatever is
their due").
57. Burke, Speech on Reconciliation with America (March 22, 1775),
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understand that there is an unlimited array of unhealthful
social conditions that predispose youth to commit crime. We
all understand, for example,. that in any society in which a rela-
tively small proportion of the people is comfortable and well
taken care of and the rest are not, the amount of property
crime by the dispossessed against the possessed is naturally
going to increase. Some who would not under more favorable
circumstances steal another person's property might yield to
the temptation in the face of hungry children, persistent depri-
vation, or even out-of-control consumerism.
A society in which a large proportion of its youth has its
already restricted moral sensibilities deadened by drugs or
alcohol might well expect a high incidence of crime; and as
long as these conditions are present, all the "wars" that our
governments can dream up will not change this unfortunate
condition.
My point is simply this: The juvenile court system, like the
adult criminal system, is capable at best of having only a rela-
tively small impact on the total number of crimes committed in
any given society. Only a small proportion of those who violate
the law get arrested, and an even smaller proportion get to
court--adult orjuvenile. Because of a lot of demagogic clamor
and public disinformation, the courts too often get blamed for
adverse social conditions over which they have very little con-
trol.58 Those who overestimate the power or capacity of the
juvenile court, or any court, to reduce or control criminal activ-
ity deceive the public and, worse, make the job of the courts
reprinted in EDMUND BuRKE: SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 168 (P. Stanlis
ed. 1963).
58. This point was quite well expressed in the 1985 Robert Houghwout
Jackson Memorial Speech given at the National Judicial College by Sol
Wachtler, Chief Judge of New York:
People in high public office who, rather than addressing the
causes of crime, divert society's attention by saying, in substance, "If
the courts did their work, everything would be all right."
... We know, and it should be recognized, that violent crime is
in some large measure caused by a flawed society. ... What we do
not know, is what to do about it, or, to be more precise, whether we
are willing to devote the resources to try. That is a debate for
another day.
But that debate cannot be conducted constructively if society is
allowed and encouraged to blame the courts. If society is permitted
to look out the window instead of its own mirror.
Speech by Hon. Sol Wachtler, "The Courts Are Doing What They Are Sup-
posed To Do," 3, 4-5, Robert Houghwout Jackson Memorial Lecture Series,
The National Judicial College, Reno, Nevada (Aug. 9, 1985) (emphasis
added).
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even more difficult than it already is. The juvenile courts can
hold young criminals morally and legally responsible for their
acts and can try to deter and reform them, but this cannot be
expected, as it often is, to cure our social ills.
4. Testing the Justice Model
Nothing that lacks justice can be morally right.
. Cicero 9
I argue for a justice model in the juvenile court, a model
that incorporates both retributive justice and distributive jus-
tice. Adoption of this model will give clarity of purpose to the
juvenile court and will end its identity crisis. It will also bring
about the rehabilitation of an essentially good system that has
suffered a moral deficit traceable to and inherent in its origins.
To test my thesis I decided to examine briefly how the
moral model might work in the real world. I certainly would
not presume to present here any kind of "model juvenile court
act." I will try only to apply very tentatively some of my ideas
to the various categories commonly associated with the work of
the juvenile court. I find that a moral model fits rather well
into the present scheme of things and that there is no need to
talk of dismantling or reconstructing the present system. A
change to a moral model will necessarily be followed by struc-
tural and procedural changes, but I believe that these changes
can be carried out by relatively limited alterations of present
juvenile court legislation.
I will now discuss some, but not all, of a variety of relevant
juvenile court topics, including the legislative purpose clause,
adjudication of delinquents' guilt or innocence, transfer to
adult court, disposition and sentencing, juvenile probation,
and the critical juvenile court function of rehabilitating and
reeducating juveniles who have violated the criminal law. It is
only by putting the proposed justice model to this kind of test
that we can determine whether it makes sense.
A. Legislative Purpose Clause
To install a justice model in the juvenile courts I would
first urge the enactment of a legislative purpose clause which
would require the juvenile court to do justice. The following
purpose clause should suffice in spelling out the dual purpose
of the juvenile court in doing justice:
59. CICERO, DE OFFICIIS, Book I, ch. 19, § 62 at 65 (W. Miller trans.
1913).
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The first purpose of the juvenile court in delinquency
matters is, by imposition of appropriate punitive sanc-
tions, to hold criminal offendersjustly and fairly account-
able for their crimes, thereby maintaining the integrity of
the criminal law and conveying a public lesson to
juveniles and to the public at large that in the juvenile
court the law is upheld.
The second purpose of the juvenile court in delinquency
matters is to influence criminal offenders in a manner
that will lead them to discontinue their criminal conduct
and to develop individual responsibility for lawful
behavior.
The juvenile court is a special court for the underaged
and as such must necessarily act in a manner that recog-
nizes the unique characteristics and needs of juveniles.
Juvenile court judges, having special training and skills
relating to the problems of delinquent youth, shall have
an affirmative duty to take whatever measures that are
necessary to carry out the reformative and rehabilitative
ends mentioned above.
B. Organization of the Court
Two different kinds of children come before the juvenile
court, criminal and non-criminal. To recognize this difference
I would divide the court into two divisions, delinquent and
civil. The 1899 act provided for a unified jurisdiction over
"dependent, neglected and delinquent " ' children. This lump-
ing of poor and criminal children together in the same jurisdic-
tional category is consistent with the traditional theory that
neglected children and delinquent children are indistinguish-
able victims of their environment. Such an attempted homoge-
nization of criminal and non-criminal children is not consistent
with a moral model. The jurisprudence and procedures of civil
and criminal law are sufficiently different so as to justify the
institution of two different juvenile court divisions. I envision a
civil division to hear the cases of incorrigible youth and of
neglected and abused children who are in need of the court's
protection. The other division, a delinquency division, would
have different rules and procedures, would hear cases involving
violations of the criminal law. 61
60. Illinois Juvenile Court Act § 1, 1899 I11. Laws 131.
61. Having a separate division for delinquents and thereby recognizing
the culpability of those who violate the law is inconsistent with traditional
juvenile court philosophy and contrary to a substantial body of social science
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The delinquency division would in turn be divided into
two branches because two different kinds of delinquent "chil-
dren" come before the court. The juvenile court should at last
recognize the difference between a child and a non-child. The
juvenile court obviously should not be dealing with a seven-
teen-year-old professional safe-cracker in the same manner that
it deals with a twelve-year-old petty thief; there is a qualitative
difference between the two. I think that this reality requires the
establishment of a two-tiered system in the delinquency divi-
sion, one part for real children, the other for older adolescents
and youths. The age of fourteen, the age used at common law,
would probably be a good dividing point so that the juvenile or
children's branch would have jurisdiction over children under
age fourteen (fifteen might be all right), and a youth branch
would have jurisdiction over criminal youth of ages fifteen, six-
teen, seventeen, and perhaps older.6 2
C. Adjudication
Adjudication is the fact-finding, guilt-determining stage of
juvenile court process. My first concern here is to rid the delin-
quency adjudication process of Gaultamania. This should be
quite easy in the lower-aged, juvenile branch, where we need
not be concerned with the type of procedurally-deficient,
unconstitutional imprisonment that concerned the Supreme
Court in Gault 63and Winship."
It must be remembered that juvenile court, by its nature, is
a court of grace. At common law, children over seven years of
age were subject to criminal prosecution. 65 Under juvenile
court law all children under a certain age, usually eighteen, are
immune from criminal prosecution. Since they receive the
research. During the 1970's a fad called "labeling theory" was much in
vogue. Under this theory, care should be taken not to condemn criminal
youth by stigmatizing or "labeling" them as wrongdoers. Labeling
wrongdoers as wrongdoers, the theory goes, tends to create a "self-fulfilling
prophesy" that makes future delinquency more, rather than less, probable.
Fortunately this theory has now, after the expenditure of millions of dollars
in social science research funds, been generally discredited. Even if the
theory were valid, I would be opposed on moral grounds to absolving young
law violators from blame or shame.
62. Because law violators coming under the jurisdiction of the youth
branch would be subject to stricter controls and severer sanctions, intramural
"transfer" from the juvenile branch to the youth branch might be considered
in cases of very serious crimes by younger children.
63. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
64. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
65. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAw 398 (2d ed. 1986).
1991)
414 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5
grace of criminal immunity, it is not unreasonable that
juveniles- should receive less in the way of the protective for-
malities associated with criminal prosecutions and that they be
afforded more informal but orderly procedures which adjudi-
cate facts in a fair but not a legalistic manner. In all adjudica-
tory proceedings in the lower-aged, juvenile branch of the
court the guilt phase would normally be conducted without
judicial intervention (although possibly with some kind ofjudi-
cial review) and would follow an administrative law model with,
of course, proper notice and a fair hearing. Hearings officers,
lay panels, and even peer tribunals would be the order of the
day. Proof of charges would be by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. No punitive confinement would result from these kinds
of proceedings, and no federal constitutional issues would be
implicated.
In cases of older youths in the youth branch, in most cases
I would employ the same informal proceeding as those of the
juvenile branch. More formal adjudicatory proceedings would
be conducted only in cases in which the prosecutor notified the
accused youth in advance of the state's intention to seek puni-
tive confinement. In these cases, and only in these cases, would
I anticipate the necessity of formal trial before a judge or refe-
ree, representation by counsel, and the other federal constitu-
tional protections mandated in Gault," Winship,67 and related
cases.
The adjudicatory process under a justice model can be
summarized by saying: "Don't make a federal case out of it."
Given the available noninstitutional, nonrestrictive juvenile
court dispositions available for delinquents young and old,
there is no reason why we cannot greatly simplify the fact-find-
ing and adjudicatory process. I should be careful about saying
this, but the fact that almost all juveniles who are brought
before the court on delinquency charges have in truth commit-
ted the crime charged is a fact that we should not be required
to ignore. The chances of administrative adjudications being
conducted unfairly are not high; and it seems very unlikely that
juveniles will suffer injustices under the informal adjudicatory
system that I have described.o'
66. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
67. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
68. The ludicrous overuse of criminal-court formalities is well
illustrated in an article on the subject written almost eighty years ago. In a
1911 edition of a legal periodical called the Green Bag an article entitled
"Treating the Child as a Criminal" tells of a lawyer employed to defend a boy
for theft. A jury was empaneled (oddly enough the early juvenile courts acts
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D. Disposition
In addition to a clear statement of purpose, the juvenile
court is in need of direction as to how its delinquent subjects
are to be managed after they have been found guilty of criminal
conduct. The sole function of disposition in the original, treat-
ment-centered juvenile court was clear, straightforward, and
unproblematical: to diagnose the social illness of the delin-
quent and then to administer the appropriate treatment, to the
end that the delinquent juvenile would no longer become
involved in criminal activity. The function of disposition in
today's juvenile court is no longer so singularly clear. If my
proposed justice model were adopted, a welcome clarity would
be restored to what juvenile court dispositions are all about.
First, a delinquent must be held "accountable." This
means that the juvenile must suffer some unpleasant conse-
quences as a sanction for wrongdoing. By "unpleasant conse-
provided for jury trials) and witnesses were called. The boy raised his
privilege against self-incrimination when his confession was introduced. As
stated in the article, "[a] lengthy trial, costing $150 and an attorney's fee,
resulted in lasting injury to the boy, because he felt less guilty on account of
the attempt to justify him and to get him free." Treating the Child as a Criminal,
23 THE GREEN BAG 803, 803 (1911). In a poignant piece of precognition
showing the fault of Gault, the article tells this story about the lawyer after
the trial:
That night when the lawyer entered his home he was met with
an exclamation from his little girl: "Oh, papal Harry stole some
apples from Mrs. Fern's yard; Jimmy Peters saw him."
After supper, father said: "Come here, Harry, and tell me about
it; I am ashamed that my boy would steal apples. Why did you do
it?"
"Well, papa, they looked so nice, I - I -"
"I object to Harry's telling on himself in that way," interrupted
the mother, who was a prime mover in the establishment of the
juvenile court and had been present at the hearing in court that
afternoon.
"But, mother, Jimmy saw him take them."
"That makes no difference," replied the mother. "I will call in
Mrs. Smith, Mrs. Green, Mrs. Jones, Mrs. Thomas and Mrs. Franks.
We will get Jimmy and any others you want to tell what they know
and after we hear them all the women will decide whether Harry
stole the apples. Harry shall not tell on himself. You will have to
prove it."
"Wife, this is foolish; Harry knows he stole the apples and we
can settle this right here in the family without the whole
neighborhood being called in. There is no use branding our boy a
thief."
"Are you sure it will be constitutional?" said the wife, with a
twinkle in her eye.
Id. at 83-84.
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quences," I have in mind a whole array of possible
punishments from slight intrusions into the juvenile's freedom
of movement to fairly serious penalties involving restrictive,
institutional confinement. For example, for relatively minor
offenses the juvenile tribunal might issue a punitive reprimand.
This would involve an official reprimand accompanied by some
form of palpable punishment, which could include such conse-
quences as home detention, denial of driving privileges and
required attendance at prescribed competency training pro-
grams. These programs would include, wherever possible,
reading and vocational training which would assist in attempts
to reeducate the subjects of these dispositions. More serious or
repeated offenses would call for the next level of severity, puni-
tive supervision, a disposition that would involve formal or infor-
mal probationary supervision by assigned probation officers,
accompanied, where needed, by "crash" or demonstrative
short-term detention. The most serious and severe disposition
would be restrictive detention, which would mean a punitive loss
of liberty, accompanied by a rehabilitative program.
The single most important rehabilitative factor of juvenile
court disposition is the lesson given, namely, that you cannot
get away with it. Still, there is an increasing number of youths
coming before the juvenile court who are virtually incapable of
learning that lesson from any kind of punishment that the juve-
nile court or any other institution might fashion. Let me give a
few examples. The first example that comes to mind is the
many victims of violent childhood abuse. Study after study
confirms the high correlation relationship between serious
childhood abuse and later violent criminality.6 9 Court action in
imposing punishment on this type of offender very often will
not have much of an effect on the likelihood of whether these
victim-victimizers will commit further violent crime. If we have
any interest in preventing these offenders from continuing to
hurt themselves and others, we must place greater emphasis on
devising and implementing intensive retraining and counseling
programs for them.70
There are, of course, other types of juveniles who are not
readily susceptible to being deterred or reformed. It is among
69. See generally Roberts, Family Treatment, in JUVENILE JUSTICE:
POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES 220-22 (A. Roberts ed. 1989).
70. See Jones, A Judge's View, in D. SANDBIRG, THE CHILD ABUSE-
DELINQUENCY QUESTION 75 (1989); A. COFFEY, JUVENILE JUSTICE AS A SYSTEM:
LAw ENFORCEMENT TO REHABILITATION, 16-29 (1974), in which can be found
an excellent exposition of the programs that can be instituted for violent
offenders who have a history of physical abuse.
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these youths that we find the young criminals who commit the
vast majority of our juvenile offenses. It is here that we must
concentrate our energies so that we might find ways to care for
and discipline these offenders in a manner that will address the
major source of juvenile crime.
E. Transfer
"Transfer" refers to the process of denying the grace of
juvenile court to certain juveniles who have committed serious
crimes. Consistent with the traditional clinical model of the
early juvenile court, the decision to deny juvenile treatment
and transfer a delinquent to the adult court for possible prison
sentence is, in most jurisdictions, based on the juvenile court's
subjective determination as to whether the juvenile court has
the proper medicine for a particular delinquent's malady.
Thus, believe it or not, transfer decisions are still being made
on the basis of whether a subject juvenile is believed by some
judge to be "fit" for juvenile court "treatment," i.e. curable by
juvenile court therapy. If the juvenile is seen to be a poor treat-
ment prospect, he or she is likely to be judged to be unfit for
the clinical efforts of the juvenile court and hence subject to
banishment.
I would eliminate all this nonsense. In fact, I would abol-
ish the whole process of transfer.
One of the biggest problems with transferring juveniles to
the adult court is that the adult court does not know what to do
with these banished juveniles. In an effort to "get tough,"
many legislatures throughout the country have been causing
more and more juveniles to be transferred to the adult sys-
tem. 7  What happens to these transferees is that, although
sometimes juveniles are sent to a prison where they become
integral members of our adult criminal society, more fre-
quently they receive probation and no appreciable sanction at
all because of judges' understandable unwillingness to send
these youngsters to adult prison.
All but the most vicious, violent and irremediably incorri-
gible youth should be kept in the juvenile system where there is
some hope for them. The travesty of wholesale "automatic
transfer ' 72 and transfer of "unamenable" juvenile delinquents
to an unprepared adult criminal system could be avoided if
71. See generally Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
471, 504-19 (1987).
72. "Automatic transfer" is a misnomer which refers to the legislative
19911
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suitable and condign punishment were available in the juvenile
system.
I must add, however, that certain offenders and certain
crimes simply cannot be properly adjudicated and disposed of
in the juvenile court environment. I would not presume to say
at this juncture just what kind of offender and what kind of
offense should be excluded, but the grace of juvenile court
should be withdrawn from certain repetitive offenders and
from older offenders who commit the most atrocious of crimes.
This does not really involve a transfer at all. There is no
"'transfer" to the adult system as such, merely a refusal to. grant
the grace of the juvenile court to certain classes of crime and
criminals. 3
F. Probation
Juvenile probation will be different under a justice model.
Obviously juvenile probation officers will not be wasting so
much of their time preparing "diagnostic" reports filled with
useless information that no one ever reads or needs to read.
Probation officers are not field medics or nurses carrying out
the orders of doctor-judges. No one is sick, and no one is
going to be cured. Once this is accepted and understood, the
juvenile probation officers can go about performing some very
valuable work.
Under any system or model, I think the most important
thing that juvenile probation officers do is to provide juveniles
an example of what a good, decent, law-abiding human being
looks like. Some young people have never seen such a crea-
ture. Beyond this, the vital, active functions of a juvenile pro-
bation officer will be: (1) to recommend to the court
appropriate punitive dispositions; (2) to recommend to the
court rehabilitative measures that are needed in addition to the
rehabilitative effects inherent in the punitive disposition; (3) to
ensure compliance with the orders of the court with respect to
retributive and rehabilitative dispositions; (4) to report to the
court on the successes and failures of the dispositional pro-
grams; and (5) to visit, supervise and follow up on designated
decision to exclude certain juveniles from the grace of the juvenile court,
without judicial intervention. See generaly id at 494-99.
73. What to do with the growing number of extremely violent or
repetitively criminal youths who, I am suggesting, do not deserve to remain
within the graces of the juvenile court is a problem which obviously we
cannot ignore. As .I have said, the adult system does not know what to do
with these people. Perhaps it can learn.
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delinquent wards, who in the opinion of the court or the proba-
tion officer are in need of personal contact or counseling.
I am hoping that the adoption of a justice model will sim-
plify rather than complicate the job of juvenile probation
officers, for the important job of these officers is not the rela-
tively easy job of dealing with the self-correcting kind of juve-
nile delinquent that you and I were. Their job is a truly hard
and frustrating one: to reform the unreformables and to deter
the undeterrables. The probation case-load is made up of
intractables-young criminals who, for example, see nothing
wrong in what they are doing and look at being caught as
merely the reflection of superior power that interferes with the
carrying out of their normal criminal occupation. Many youth-
ful drug dealers do not have any conception of doing anything
wrong. Likewise, many of today's "underclass" youth look at
mugging and theft from the "have's" as a virtuous, productive
and perhaps revolutionary activity. It is not an easy task either
to deter or to reform significant numbers of these young
criminals, but we must try, principally because we know that
errant juveniles are more subject to being able to change their
lives than adults. Our limited resources are more efficiently
spent trying to reform young persons rather than old. The real
heart-beat of the juvenile system is the work of its probation
officers. A justice model will make their difficult job simpler.
5. Conclusion: The Spirit of '99
To no one will we deny jutice....
Magna Carta 1215""
I have presumed to call for the rehabilitation of our system
of juvenile courts. We should try to reform, remodel and
remoralize these courts because that would be the right thing
to do and because the courts would run more effectively and
efficiently under a clearly defined justice model.
I want to remodel the system, not dismantle it. I applaud a
society that thinks enough of its young people to create a spe-
cial court to deal with their problems. I applaud the women
and men who do the difficult and important work that is being "
done by the juvenile courts despite the ideological weaknesses
which I have described. I want to maintain and continue the
74. Magna Carta § 40 (Eng. 1215), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 17 (R. Perry ed., rev. ed. 1978).
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juvenile courts of this country in essentially their present form;
but I want them to do justice.
In delinquency cases the first office of the juvenile court is
to administer retributive justice in a manner that accommo-
dates the diminished capacity of youth and their universally
understood attributes-imperfect judgment, immature atti-
tudes, impulsivity, the difficult-to resist need to please their
peers, and other such traits that justify our treating young law
violators differently from older ones.
The juvenile courts must also be required to recognize the
morally mandated and legislatively imposed duty to care for
and discipline delinquent juveniles by undertaking the rehabili-
tative programs that are their due. Juvenile courts must admin-
ister distributive as well as retributive justice. We must attend
to what we dofor our juveniles as well as to what we do to them.
Although it may appear at first paradoxical to the reader,
in many ways I yearn for the child-centered philosophy of the
spirit of 1899. If we can avoid stripping the juvenile court of its
moral content and say goodbye to the clinical model, there is
very much indeed to commend the "Spirit of '99." The spirit of
the 1899 Illinois juvenile court act was parens patriae, the state as
a good parent. I believe that the Illinois law-makers were right
when they instructed the state's newly-created juvenile courts
to treat their wards in a manner that approximated "as nearly
as may be that which should be given by their parents.""5
These words should be taken to mean that juveniles are to be
punished and then cared for in a manner that is likely to foster
future good conduct. As parents reprove, punish, and then
guide their prodigal children, so should the state's juvenile
courts act as parens patriae, in reproving, punishing and then
guiding delinquent juveniles. I have made some suggestions as
to how the spirit of '99 can be embodied in a remodeled, reha-
bilitated court ofjuvenile justice. I hope I have provided some-
thing worth thinking about.
75. Illinois Juvenile Court Act § 21, 1899 III. Laws 137.
